Abstract-Originators seek to mitigate the loss of monopoly power by authorizing generic entry prior to patent expiry. Off-patent competition may be adversely affected if authorized generic entry substantially lowers the attractiveness of subsequent generic entry. This study assesses the impact of authorized generic entry on independent generic entry in recent cases of patent expiry in Germany. The results of a recursive bivariate probit regression, accounting for the endogeneity of authorized generic entry, show that authorized generic entry has no significant effect on the likelihood of generic entry. Business scope expansion and rent-seeking motives drive authorized generic entry decisions.
I. Introduction
A S blockbuster drugs lose patent protection and drug pipelines have run dry, big pharma seeks ways to limit profit erosion following generic entry. One practice originators commonly embark on is the introduction of authorized generic drugs through a generic subsidiary or supply partner that markets a generic version of the brand-name drug prior to loss of exclusivity (patent or supplementary protection certificate expiration). 1 The increasing frequency of authorized generic entry has raised policy concerns (Federal Trade Commission, 2002 European Commission, 2008 ). Authorized generics eliminate generic firms' first-mover opportunity and capture a disproportionately large share of generic revenues as first generic entrants. This could drastically lower incentives for independent generic entry and decrease the intensity of off-patent competition. The European Commission (2009) notes that "the possibility to obtain a first-mover advantage is important from a competition policy perspective, because it stimulates companies to enter the market as quickly as possible, thereby creating competition and bringing down prices for consumers." This study provides a recent and comprehensive assessment of the impact of authorized generic entry on the likelihood that an independent generic company enters a drug market following patent expiry.
In the light of the rising costs of pharmaceutical products in industrialized nations and the increasing reliance on costcontainment on the widespread use of generic drugs, such evidence is important for policymakers. 2 To date, there is no comprehensive empirical evidence based on recent data that would show authorized generic entry to have had a delaying or deterring effect on generic entry (Berndt et al. 2007a) . Apart from the study by Berndt et al. (2007a; Berndt, Mortimer, & Parece, 2007b) , peer-reviewed analyses (Hollis, 2003; Reiffen & Ward, 2007) rely on data from the late 1980s and early and mid-1990s. Virtually all studies focus on the U.S. pharmaceutical market and explore how authorized generics affect generics' incentives to challenge patents and obtain exclusive first market entry. As patent challengers form only one important subgroup of the overall generic firm population (Berndt et al., 2007a; Higgins & Graham, 2009; Branstetter, Chatterjee, & Higgins, 2011) , the question remains whether authorized generics affect incentives for independent generic entry broadly, across the whole firm population.
This empirical study uses unique and recent firm-level data that track generic entry and market exclusivity expiry in the German pharmaceutical market from 2002 to 2007. The German generic drug market is the second largest generic drug market in the world, attracting the highest number of authorized and independent generic entries in Europe over this time period (European Commission, 2009) . As a key generic drug market, it provides important insights into how authorized generics affect generic firms' ability to cover the costs of market entry and thus incentives for independent generic entry. As a result of the significant overlap in drug markets experiencing authorized generic entry and the similarity in generic market share dynamics across countries, these insights are relevant in both the European and U.S. context. This study, resorting to a recursive bivariate probit estimator, is the first to quantify the impact of authorized generic entry on generic entry while accounting for the endogeneity of authorized generic entry (Hollis & Liang, 2006; Federal Trade Commission, 2009 . Identification relies on functional form and one exclusion restriction. The employed instrument Share of Non-Core Product Introductions, measuring the number of nongeneric, noncore product introductions of the originator in the year prior to loss of exclusivity relative to the size of the drug portfolio, captures originators' willingness to issue authorized generic drugs. The authorization of generic entry and the introduction of nongeneric, noncore products prior to loss of exclusivity are closely related. Coping with patent expiration and empty drug pipelines, originators expand not only into generics but also into diagnostics or medical devices among other noncore fields of business. The results from the bivariate probit regression indicate that the likelihood of generic entry is not significantly affected by authorized generic entry. Generic entry decisions are mainly influenced by preentry revenues and firms' therapeutic and drug form experience. Preentry revenues explain a variation of 48.9% in the likelihood that a generic firm enters a particular drug market. Authorized generic entry decisions in turn are strongly determined by preentry revenues and the share of noncore product introductions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides industry information. Section III reviews the literature on authorized generic entry. Section IV describes the data, and section V specifies the empirical model. Section VI presents and discusses the empirical findings. Concluding remarks follow in section VII.
II. Industry Background
With a market size of 9.9 billion euros, the German generic drug market is the largest market in Europe and the second largest in the world as of 2007. 3 The market authorization process for generic drugs in this market is regulated in Article 10 of EU directive 2001/83/EC, which defines a generic drug product as "a medicinal product which has the same qualitative and quantitative composition in active substances and the same pharmaceutical form as the reference medicinal product." According to industry experts, 4 it takes about six months to demonstrate therapeutic equivalence in bioequivalence studies and about three years to attest to the drug's shelf life in drug stability studies. 5 Once the eight-year data exclusivity period starting from the brand drug's market launch has expired, makers of generic drugs are legally entitled to conduct bioequivalence studies and file for abridged market approval. 6 In abridged applications for market authorization, generic companies refer to the expert reviews and clinical test results from the brand drug's approval process without notice or permission of the originator, making further clinical safety and efficacy trials unnecessary. The preferred procedure for generic market approval in Europe is the decentralized procedure (DCP), which is scheduled to be completed in 300 days. Generic entry usually occurs the minute originators' market exclusivity, conferred by the patent or supplementary protection certificate (SPC), expires, provided that ten years have elapsed since the brand drug's market launch. 7 3 This figure includes all sales of generic drugs for human use at exfactory prices (Generic Drugs in Germany, Datamonitor, August 2008); The generic efficiency rate (fraction of multisource drug prescriptions dispensed as generic) amounts to 68% (own calculation based on Insight Health prescription data). 4 This information is based on expert interviews conducted with the German Pharmaceutical Industry Association (Bundesverband der Pharmazeutischen Industrie e.V.: BPI).
5 Firms prove that the drug product remains within the established specifications, maintaining its identity, strength, quality, and purity throughout the expiration period of typically three years. Tests are run under varying storage temperatures (25
• , 30
• , 40
• ) and humidity levels in months 0, 6, 12, 18, 24, and 36. 6 Bioequivalence studies can be carried out independent of the reference drug's status of patent protection. With the implementation of the Bolar provision in German law, "working under patent" became legal. For applications filed in Germany prior to November 2005, the data exclusivity period amounts to ten years. 7 If originators apply within six months after the brand drug's market approval for the SPC and the national patent office approves the request, Under Article 10c of directive 2001/83/EC, originators may authorize a generic division or licensee to introduce a generic version of the brand-name drug prior to loss of exclusivity. 8 In contrast to independent generics, which need to await market exclusivity expiry and whose entry costs depend on the state of data exclusivity, authorized generics do not face either restriction. Originators tend to introduce authorized generics on a case-by-case and country-by-country basis in the year prior to loss of exclusivity (European Commission, 2009 ). Our own investigations reveal that authorized generics were issued in sixteen drug markets in Germany from 2002 to 2007. 9 In ten of these markets, authorized generic entry took also place in the United States. 10 According to industry experts, originators form expectations about the number of generic entrants for a molecule on the basis of market size, yet they have little or no information in regard to individual generic entry decisions prior to entry. 11 Generic firms, preparing for market entry at least three years ahead of time, effectively sink costs simultaneously and can also form expectations about the rate of generic entry. 12 As long as firms seek market approval in the EU, they rely on one bioequivalence and drug stability study. 13 Market authorization costs depend on the number of countries in which approval is sought. Firms typically designate six or seven EU member states. As a rule, they designate Germany, which accounted for 45% (30%) of the European generic market value in 2005 (2007) . 14 The costs of generic market entry in Germany and selected European member states ranges between 180,000 and 420,000 euros, and is large in the exclusivity period may be extended by up to five years. The ten-year protection period (marketing exclusivity period) will be extended for another year (8 + 2 + 1 rule) if the originator obtains within eight years after market entry approval for one or more therapeutic indications which are held to bring a significant clinical benefit in comparison to existing therapies. 8 The manufacture of authorized generics can be carried out at the facilities of the innovator or licensee. 11 Grants of market authorization are frequently delayed (Accenture, 2005; European Commission, 2009 ). Granted generic drug approvals are published by the national medicine agency. In Germany, the Bundesinstitut für Arzneimittel und Medizinprodukte (BfArM) publishes drug approvals biannually in the Bundesanzeiger.
12 STADA prepares for market entry at least three years prior to loss of exclusivity according to a firm statement (www.stada.de/unternehmen /zum_unternehmen/konzern-profil/spitzenstellung.asp).
13 Bioequivalence requirements differ somewhat in the United States and Asia (DiCiccio, 2008; Dangi, Soni, & Namdeo, 2010) .
14 Generic Drugs in Germany, Datamonitor (August 2006 and . Preentry revenues denote drug revenues at ex-factory prices, in millions of euros, measured two years prior to loss of exclusivity. The duration of monopoly measures the number of years from a brand drug's market approval to loss of exclusivity. Substitute drugs treat the same indication(s) and are measured two years prior to loss of exclusivity. Therapeutic areas are classified by the ATC system at the third level of aggregation (ATC3).
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comparison to the average size of drug markets in Germany (33.5 million euros; table 1). 15 Order of entry plays a crucial role in generic drug markets (European Commission, 2009) . Authorized generics enjoy a substantial first-mover advantage, maintaining on average a share of 35.9% of generic sales in Germany over a three-year period. 16 Generic market shares are generally highly concentrated and persistent over time. Such market dynamics for undifferentiated products are less puzzling once generic drug substitution rules, drug reimbursement regulations, and consumer switching costs are factored in. Following the enforcement of generic substitution in Germany in 2002, pharmacists, along with patients, tend to choose among generic products of different producers that contain the same active ingredient. 17 Due to largely fixed dispensing fees and copayments, both have a low financial incentive to switch among generic products unless price differentials are large. 18 Pharmacists also avoid switching patients, who generally have a strong preference for the first-consumed generic product (Gupta & Yu, 2012) given its recognizable shape, size, and color.
The market share of the brand drug drops rapidly following generic entry. When originators decide to issue generics prior to loss of exclusivity, they face a trade-off. On the one hand, 15 An overview of the costs of generic market entry in Germany and selected European member states can be found in the online supplement in appendix A. 16 Our own calculations based on retail pharmacy data for 35 oral drug markets in Germany from 2002 to 2007, where I observe generic competition at least for one year following patent expiration. 17 In February 2002 the Aut-idem regulation was introduced for prescription drugs: pharmacists are encouraged to dispense one of the 30% lowest-priced generic drug products unless the physician excludes generic substitution, checking the Aut-idem box on the prescription pad. Latest figures by Insight Health indicate that the Aut-idem quota (fraction of nonsubstitution prescriptions) amounts to 14% in 2008 . If a more costly generic drug product is specified on the prescription pad, the pharmacists can dispense any generic product up to that price level. 18 As of 2004 pharmacists receive 8.10 euros for each dispensed medication, plus a 3% share of the retail price. Since January 2004, patients who are covered by statutory health insurance (85% of the German population) need to make drug copayments. The copay amounts to 10% of the retail price, where by the minimum copay amounts to 5 euros and the maximum copay is restricted to 10 euros. As of May 2006 copayments do not apply to drug products that are priced at least 30% below the reference price (maximum prescription drug coverage). As most generic drugs are sold in packages priced below 50 euros, patients are often inclined not to search for a cheaper drug with the same active ingredient (Accenture, 2005) . the authorized generic starts cutting into the brand drug's sales earlier. On the other hand, the authorized generic provides an important revenue stream after patent expiration. If the authorized generic deters subsequent generic entrants to an extent that generic penetration and price competition are weakened, this may also support brand revenues. 19 Regulations in the United States seek to encourage generic entry through a 180-day exclusivity period for the first generic to challenge the brand-name drug's patents, which may earn substantial profits during this period unless authorized generics enter. 20 While there is no corollary to the 180-day exclusivity period in Germany or other countries, authorized generics might nevertheless deter generic entry, eliminating firms' opportunity to realize a first-mover advantage and eroding the profits available to them by capturing a disproportionately large share of generic revenues. Put differently, authorized generics might affect incentives for independent generic entry broadly, beyond the set of firms that challenge drug patents. 21
III. Literature Review
The distinctive features of competition in off-patent drug markets have attracted the attention of various economists. Previous empirical studies show that preentry revenues (Scott Morton, 1999; Saha et al., 2006) , firm and drug characteristics (Scott Morton, 1999) , and the brand drug's goodwill stock (Hurwitz & Caves, 1988; Hudson, 2000) are important determinants of generic entry. Closely related to this empirical work is the literature on patent challenges (Higgins 19 Generic penetration tends to be lower in markets in which authorized generics operate (European Commission, 2009) . 20 Under the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, the first generic to file an abbreviated new drug application with a successful paragraph IV certification (patent noninfringement or invalidity claim) is granted a 180-day exclusivity period, where no firm except for the authorized generic may market the same version of the drug. 21 Abbreviated new drug applications with paragraph IV certificates accounted for only about 20% of all generic entry in the United States in the late 1990s (Berndt et al., 2007a ) and for about 40% by the end of the 2000s (Higgins & Graham, 2009; Branstetter et al., 2011) . According to Branstetter et al. (2011) , "Teva Pharmaceuticals is the most prolific filer of paragraph IV challenges although there has been increased activity in recent years by Indian generic manufacturers." The Federal Trade Commission (2011) points out also that originators often introduce their own generics after the 180-day exclusivity period or when no exclusivity had occurred. & Graham, 2009; Hemphill & Sampat, 2010; Branstetter et al., 2011) and originator defensive strategies (Danzon & Furukawa, 2011; Fisher-Ellison & Ellison, 2011) . As a response to patent challenges and the threat of generic entry, originators may pursue defensive strategies. The introduction of second-generation products, the reformulation of drugs to sell them over the counter rather than by prescription (Rx-to-OTC switch), and the authorization of generic entry prior to patent expiry are among the best-known strategies. Danzon and Furukawa (2011) examine the impact of licencees (cobranding) and new formulations on the probability of generic entry and the number of generic entrants for a molecule in ten countries, including the United States and Germany, from 1998 to 2009. They find little effect of defensive strategies. Fisher-Ellison and Ellison (2011) show that entry-deterring behavior is important in midsized markets, as there is little risk of entry in small markets and deterrence is infeasible in high-revenue pharmaceutical markets.
Previous empirical studies on authorized generic entry (Hollis, 2003; Reiffen & Ward, 2007; Berndt et al., 2007a ) reach ambiguous conclusions. There is consensus that generic first movers enjoy a considerable and long-lasting advantage over subsequent entrants (Caves et al., 1991; Grabowski & Vernon, 1992; Hollis, 2002; Gupta & Yu, 2012) . 22 Not only can the first entrant serve the market for a longer period of time, with fewer rivals and higher generic profits after patent expiry, it can also capture and sustain a larger market share over a multiple-year period. Controversy still remains over the extent to which authorized generics lower incentives for independent generic entry and harm off-patent competition. Hollis (2003) explains that patients' unwillingness to switch between medications, search and persuasion costs of doctors, and the administrative costs of pharmacies when stocking several identical generic drugs result in switching costs. In light of evidence of large and long-term firstmover advantages in the Canadian generic market, Hollis (2002) concludes that authorized generics (brand-controlled pseudo-generics) deter independent generic entry. Reiffen and Ward (2007) examine the motivation of originators to introduce authorized generics prepatent expiry in the United States. Relying on structural estimates from earlier studies (Caves et al., 1991; Reiffen & Ward, 2005) , they show that anticipated authorized generic entry crowds out between 1.7 and 2.4 generic entrants independent of market size. Reiffen and Ward (2007) ascertain that originators introduce authorized generics in large drug markets fueled by rent-seeking motives, capturing generic profits without substantially affecting the number of generic entrants or generic prices. In small and medium-sized drug markets, by contrast, entry deterrence motives may play an important role, as the impact on generic entry and prices is comparably large. Reiffen and Ward (2007) point out that authorized generic entry 22 Berndt, Kyle, and Ling (2002) provide similar evidence for Rx-to-OTC switches of antiulcer and heartburn drugs.
is least problematic and also most profitable in high-revenue drug markets. Berndt et al. (2007a Berndt et al. ( , 2007b examine the impact of authorized generic entry on the filing of abbreviated new drug applications (ANDA) with a paragraph IV certification (claim of patent noninfringement or invalidity) in the United States. Berndt et al. (2007b) point out that several factors besides authorized generic entry may limit the profitability of the 180-day exclusivity period. They show that in spite of the increase in authorized generics since 2003, there is little change in the total number of paragraph IV certifications, paragraph IV certifications per drug, and timing of filings relative to approvals of new chemical entities. Based on a review of descriptive statistics, they conclude that the effect of authorized generic entry on independent generic entry and consumer welfare in the United States is likely to be small.
IV. Data
Through a matching of pharmaceutical market and exclusivity data, kindly provided by Insight Health, a unique microdata set has been created that tracks losses of exclusivity and generic entry at firm drug level in Germany from 2002 to 2007. 23 To ensure high quality in data matching, the study has been confined to single-molecule drugs. 24 Exclusivity data specify patent holders, originators, patent, and SPC application dates as well as market approval dates, and retail pharmacy data indicate drugs' international nonproprietary name (INN), drug trade names, drug manufacturers, product categories (e.g., diagnostics, medical devices, drugs for human use), available strengths, drug forms, therapeutic field of indication, and product launch dates. 25 Product launch and market exclusivity expiration dates facilitate the identification of authorized generic entries. Some alternative brand strategies are traceable as well. 26 Rx-to-OTC switches are 23 Insight Health has obtained exclusivity data from the national patent and trademark office since 2005. I accessed the PATDPASPC, Esp@cent Patent, Derwent and Open Drug database, Thomson's Current Patent Gazette, the FDA Orangebook, and online patent expiry reports to complement and verify the data.
24 I checked the consistency of generic entry and exclusivity dates. If generic entry occurred prior to patent or SPC expiration, investigations were carried out to find evidence for authorized generic entry or patent invalidity cases that would explain entry prior to the official date of patent (SPC) expiration. 25 The retail data reflect wholesale and direct purchase transactions of public pharmacies. Hospital sales data are not available. For the vast majority of drugs in this study (prescription drugs), retail revenues provide a sufficiently reliable measure of markets' attractiveness. In Europe, the turnover generated with prescription drugs is significantly larger in the retail segment. In 2007, the retail turnover was about three times as large as the turnover generated in the hospital segment (EUC, 2008) . The drug form classification follows the New Form Code (NFC) classification established by the European Pharmaceutical Market Research Association (EphMRA). The classification of therapeutic fields rests on the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification system, introduced by WHO in 1976. 26 An investigation of price trends shows that originators did not respond to generic entry by aggressively lowering official brand prices (see also European Commission, 2009). Prior to the introduction of rebate contracts in April 2007, there was also no possibility for pharmaceutical firms to contract with insurance companies. Originators signed such contracts increasingly often in more recent years 658 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS identifiable based on the brand drugs' prescription status, which is specified for each strength and drug form over time. Listings of drugs with similar trade names or INNs establish preliminary evidence for a second-generation product (SGP), a reformulation or new combination of the active ingredient. Information on patent litigation cases was obtained through various sources. 27 Pharmaceutical firms are known to spend a substantial fraction of revenues on promotional activities (EUC, 2009), but given the confidentiality of advertising data, it was impossible to acquire such data. 28 Preexpiration brand advertising has been shown not to be a barrier to generic entry (Scott Morton, 2000) , its intensity drastically decreasing as exclusivity expires (Berndt, Kyle, & Ling, 2003; Janakiraman et al., 2008; European Commission, 2009) , and generic advertising tends to be rare (Scherer, 2000; Berndt et al., 2003) . Nevertheless, the lack of advertising data is potentially a limitation of this study.
Seventy-nine drugs experienced loss of exclusivity between 2002 and 2007. Due to uncommon routes of administration (lung, eye, and systemic use), four of those drugs were excluded from the analysis. Two additional drugs had to be excluded as neither generic entrants nor potential generic entrants could be identified, confining the analysis to 73 drugs with a predominantly oral, topical, or parenteral drug form use. By the end of 2007, 87 generic drug manufacturers entered in 48 drug markets, resulting in 724 generic entries. 29 In 16 of those 48 drug markets, originators introduced authorized generic drugs, on average four months prior to loss of exclusivity. In most cases, supply (licensing) contracts were closed to issue an authorized generic. Generic versions of only two brand-name drugs were launched through a generic subsidiary. Table 1 outlines the key characteristics of the 73 entry opportunities arising between 2002 and 2007: the number of generic entrants, preentry market revenues, the duration of monopoly, and the number of onpatent brand (B) and off-patent substitutes that experienced generic entry (G). Notably, several market entry opportunities attract no generic entry, as generic drug manufacturers target high-revenue markets (Scott Morton, 1999; Hollis, 2003) . Also, authorized generic entry is focused on high-revenue drug markets: authorized generic entry occurs in one smallrevenue, four intermediate-sized, and eleven high-revenue drug markets, grouping the 23 smallest, 25 intermediatesized, and 25 largest drug markets with an average preentry market size of, respectively, 2.0, 17.6, and 78.3 million euros. There is a clear monotonic relationship between the occurrence of authorized generic entry and drug markets' preentry revenues.
(www.pharmazeutische-zeitung.de/index.php?id=35680;
www.pharma zeutische-zeitung.de/index.php?id=37773). 27 The Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) kindly provided information. Additional sources are www.judicialis.de, www .duesseldorfer-archiv.de, and www.landgericht-mannheim.de.
28 Direct advertising of prescription medications to consumers is illegal in the European Union. 29 Other studies report similar rates of generic entry (e.g., Magazzini, Pammoli, & Riccaboni, 2004) .
As the study assesses the impact of authorized generic entry on independent generic entry (unit of analysis is the entry decision of a generic drug manufacturer), it will ultimately also establish to what extent authorized generic entry affects the number of generic entrants for a molecule. The identification of potential entrants is necessary to determine the counterfactual outcome, that is, to make inferences about independent generic entry decisions in the absence of authorized generic entry. A firm-level analysis avoids aggregation bias, allowing for a nonuniform firm response to authorized generic entry and omitted variable bias. As discussed in more detail in section V, authorized generic entry is likely to occur in selected high-revenue drug markets, which may attract more experienced generic entrants. 30 If the positive effect of therapeutic and drug form experience on generic entry decisions (Scott Morton, 1999) is not accounted for and partially captured by authorized generic entry, the impact of the latter on independent generic entry may be understated. 31 I follow Scott Morton (1999) and employ several criteria to construct sets of potential entrants for each drug market, identifying generic entrants and firms that refrained from entry (zero entries). 32 By relying on different selection criteria, I can verify the robustness of the results and possibly obtain an upper and lower bound of the impact of authorized generic entry on independent generic entry. The pharmaceutical data set lists 393 drug manufacturers and suppliers (no reimport) with at least half of the retail form portfolio being classified as generic. 33 As I limit the set of potential entrants to generic firms with a portfolio of at least fifty retail forms, the number of firms declines to 101. These companies manufactured 94.4% of all generic retail forms available in the German pharmaceutical market between 1999 and 2007. The first set of potential entrants contains firms that operate at the time a drug's exclusivity expires (data sample 1). Although these selection criteria may seem arbitrary at first, they turn out to trace generic entrants very well and may similarly identify generic drug manufacturers that refrained from market entry. Generic entrants are found among the first group of potential entrants in 672 out of a total of 724 generic entries (92.8%). An overview of the selection criteria and firm-level data sets is presented in table 2.
Data sample 2 is constructed taking account of firms' therapeutic and drug form experiences, which have been shown to affect generic entry decisions strongly (Scott Morton, 1999) . 30 Generic entrants in the sixteen drug markets concerned tend to exhibit a notably higher level of drug form experience than generic entrants in other drug markets with no authorized generic entry.
31 Count data models, neglecting the variation in potential entrants' experiences across drug markets, may potentially be affected by omitted variable bias. Poisson, negative binomial, and zero-inflated negative binomial regressions indicate that authorized generic entry has no significant effect on the number of generic entrants for a molecule. Estimates can be obtained from the author on request.
32 Kyle (2007) determines market entry opportunities in a similar context. See also Kyle (2006) . 33 Reimport firms have supplied a minor fraction of 3.4% of all generic retail forms as of 2007. While generic entry statistics refer to the 48 drug markets with generic entry by 2007, statistics for potential entrants and zero entries are reported for all 73 drug markets, the latter being disaggregated by markets with (48) and without (25) generic entry.
The second set of potential entrants is a subset of the first group of entry candidates, containing firms that exhibit expertise in the relevant therapeutic field and the manufacture of the drug form concerned. Firms are considered to have therapeutic experience once they have marketed a positive number of medical products for the given indication as exclusivity expires. Firms are said to have drug form experience once they have launched a positive number of medical products of a given drug form as exclusivity expires. As seen in table 2, there is a strong decline in the average and median number of potential entrants as the selection criteria become stricter. 34 In data sample 1, about 100 potential entrants can be found in one drug market on average, while roughly 28 entry candidates are identified per drug market in data sample 2. These figures seem plausible, considering that around fifty to sixty generic firms operate in Germany. 35 Notably, 10% (36%) of market entry opportunities are realized in data sample 1 (2). The adopted selection criteria are not necessarily less restrictive than those employed in earlier work. Scott Morton (1999), defining a larger set of entry opportunities, finds 34 An overview of the distribution of authorized generic entries, alternative brand strategies, generic entries, and zero entries ("no entry") across the 73 drug markets can be obtained from the author on request.
35 www.acis.de/patienteninfo/generika/generika-in-deutschland.html.
that a fraction of 2% to 7% of observations undertake generic entry. 36
V. Empirical Implementation
Under uncertainty about competitors' actions, generic companies and originators effectively make entry decisions simultaneously (see section II), despite the sequential order of entry (i.e., authorized generic entry preceding independent generic entry). Order of market entry is a key determinant of the market share that generic drug manufacturers achieve. Whereas authorized generic entrants are certain to enter first and obtain a substantial market share, independent generic entrants' order of market entry is uncertain at the time they decide on market entry. Given the uncertainty about individual independent generic entry decisions and firms' ultimate order of market entry, I assume that authorized generic entry and independent generic entry decisions are made independent of the individual market entry decisions that generic competitors make. Note that the majority of generic drug manufacturers obtains a very small market share on entry only. Authorized generic entry, by contrast, has major revenue implications for generic entrants and might thus affect incentives for independent generic entry. Like previous studies (Hollis, 2003; Reiffen & Ward, 2005; Berndt et al., 2007a Berndt et al., , 2007b , I assume that generic companies can anticipate authorized generic entry. Given the frequency with which originators have recently introduced authorized generics, this assumption seems plausible. Industry experts assert that generic firms must expect authorized generic entry in large drug markets in particular. 37 In this line of reasoning, this study will test the hypothesis that authorized generic entry prior to loss of exclusivity has a significantly negative effect on independent generic entry decisions.
The group of markets in which originators issue authorized generics is not likely to be a random selection of drug markets (Hollis & Liang, 2006; Federal Trade Commission, 2009 . The same unobserved factors potentially determine both independent and authorized generic entry decisions. For instance, therapeutic innovations may change the competitive landscape and make market entry into a particular drug market less attractive than observed market characteristics suggest. Also consumers' reluctance to switch to generic products could affect expected profits and thus entry decisions (Federal Trade Commission, 2011) . 38 Originators may not introduce authorized generics in a drug market because 36 Kyle (2007) identifies 299,567 entry opportunities (drug-country-classyear observations), out of which 7,630 had a product launch (2.5%). She examines 1,444 unique molecules produced by 278 firms in 134 therapeutic classifications over the time period 1980 to 1999 in 28 European countries. 37 The Federal Trade Commission (2011) states that generic firms account for authorized generic competition in revenue forecasts. 38 Federal Trade Commission (2011) explains that therapeutic class controls cannot fully pick up such unobserved effects, in particular when the latter are not constant within a therapeutic class. Since none of the drugs in the sample can be classified as narrow therapeutic index (NTI) drugs according to the available NTI drug listings, a product-specific control is infeasible. NTI drugs are a small set of drugs where the tolerance range for 660 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS consumers are relatively reluctant to switch to generic products. Generic firms have fewer incentives to enter in this case. If there is a positive residual correlation between authorized and independent generic entry decisions, authorized generic entry will partially capture drug markets' unobserved attractiveness, as a result of which the deterring effect of authorized generic entry would be understated. For an empirical model of generic market entry, assessing the effect of authorized generic entry, it might thus be crucial to account for the endogeneity of authorized generic entry.
To obtain preliminary insights into the impact of authorized generic entry (ag m ) on the entry decision of independent generic firm i in drug market m (g im ), I first estimate a univariate probit model. This model, the specification of which is given below, accounts for the dichotomy of independent and authorized generic entry but ignores the endogeneity of the latter. It is estimated with standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm as the entry decisions of one firm across drug markets are likely dependent:
Here, the variable Generic Entry (g im ) denotes the market entry decision of an independent generic drug manufacturer. It is coded as a dummy variable taking on the value 1 if the firm enters the drug market. The dummy variable Authorized Generic Entry (ag m ) is added to the generic entry equation (1) to examine the effect of authorized generic entry. It takes on the value 1 if authorized generics are introduced to the market. Like related empirical studies (Hurwitz & Caves, 1988; Scott Morton, 1999; Hudson, 2000; Saha et al., 2006; Regan, 2008; Moreno-Torres, Puig-Junoy, & Borrell-Arque, 2009 ), I control for preentry market size, the duration of monopoly, the number of substitutes, the therapeutic field, drug form, 39 and year of loss of exclusivity (z m ). The variable Pre-Entry Revenues indicates the drug market size (in log form), which is lagged two calendar years to remove possible endogeneity. Monopoly Duration measures the number of years from the brand drug's market launch to loss of exclusivity, providing a proxy for originators' goodwill stock (Hurwitz & Caves, 1988; Hudson, 2000) . Substitutes (B) and Substitutes (G) account for the intensity of on-patent and offpatent intramolecular competition in the year of patent/SPC expiry (Regan, 2008; Moreno-Torres et al., 2009 number of off-patent substitutive active ingredients listed in the same therapeutic field(s) of indication, attracting generic entry. 40 Furthermore, I account for potential entrants' capabilities (Scott Morton, 1999; Kyle, 2006) , that is, therapeutic and drug form experience (c im ). Field Experience serves as a proxy for a firm's therapeutic experience, counting potential entrants' number of product launches in relevant therapeutic fields of indication (ATC3 classification) prior to loss of exclusivity. By counting the number of products with an identical route of administration (NFC3 classification) that have been launched prior to loss of exclusivity, Form Experience measures a generic company's drug form experience.
Next, allowing for a residual correlation (ρ) of independent and authorized generic entry decisions, I estimate a recursive bivariate probit model to address the potential endogeneity issue of authorized generic entry in the generic entry equation (1). In the bivariate probit model, the error terms im and μ m are assumed to be distributed bivariate normal,
The specification of the econometric model is given below. Except for the second equation, which presents the authorized generic entry decision (ag m ), it is identical to the univariate probit model. Standard errors are again robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm: This recursive bivariate probit model captures the simultaneity of authorized and independent generic entry decisions as well as the unidirectional effect of authorized vis-à-vis independent generic entry decisions. Identification in the bivariate probit model relies on the modeling of sequential entry and the assumption of normality. Exclusion restrictions are not required for the recursive bivariate probit model to be identified (Wilde, 2000; Greene, 2008; Greene & Hensher, 2011) if there is sufficient variation in the data. Wilde (2000) explains that this "condition is ensured by the assumption that each equation contains at least one varying exogenous regressor, an assumption which is rather weak in economic applications." In order not to rely on a functional form assumption alone, I add the instrumental variable Share of Noncore Products (snc m ) to the authorized generic entry equation. This instrument measures the number of nongeneric, noncore product introductions of the originator in the year prior to loss of exclusivity relative to the size of the drug portfolio at that time. As originators, coping with patent expiration and empty drug pipelines, expand not only into generics but also into diagnostics or medical devices among other noncore fields of business, the instrument promises to provide a valid measure of originators' willingness to introduce authorized generics, which is unrelated to independent generic entry decisions. 41 Potential differences in originators' willingness to authorize generic entry over time are captured due to the instrument's time variance. The scaling by firm size (drug portfolio size) introduces an importance weighting of noncore product introductions. 42 Share of Noncore Products will not provide a valid exclusion restriction, if, after controlling for other observed drug market and firm characteristics, it is correlated with independent generic drug manufacturers' unobserved propensity to enter a drug market. One straightforward way to address this issue, yet not a formal test, is to include the instrument in the single-equation probit regression. Single-equation models are misspecified if there is selection, but they still offer a clear sense of the patterns in the data (Evans & Schwab, 1995) . Furthermore, I conduct a likelihood-ratio test of the restricted versus unrestricted recursive bivariate probit model to show that the instrument improves identification and the model's goodness of fit.
Fisher-Ellison and Ellison (2011) show that entrydeterring behavior is not important when there is very little risk of entry (small drug markets) or when entry would be so profitable that deterrence is infeasible (large drug markets). Following this line of thought, I explore whether the effect of authorized generic entry varies across market size, interacting the dummy variable Authorized Generic Entry with Pre-Entry Revenues and the dummy variables Small and Medium reflecting the relative size of drug markets as described in section IV. The omission of alternative brand strategies could also bias the findings, depending on how the strategies are correlated with authorized and independent generic entry decisions. Danzon and Furukawa (2011) find little effect of defensive strategies (cobranding and new formulations). As a robustness test, I include the dummy variables Rx-to-OTC, SGP, and Litigation as alternative brand strategy controls in the generic entry equation. Rx-to-OTC indicates the switch from prescription to over-the-counter availability of the drug. SGP denotes the introduction of a second-generation product for the brand name drug, and Litigation indicates events of patent litigation. 43 Since its illustration in seminal papers by Evans and Schwab (1995) and Greene (1998) , the recursive bivariate probit model has been adopted in various empirical studies (Goldman et al., 2001; Jones, Xander, & van Doorslaer, 2006) to examine the effect of a binary treatment on a binary outcome in a nonrandomized setting. Bhattacharya, Goldman, and McCaffrey (2006) conduct a Monte Carlo exercise to evaluate the consistency of multivariate probit, two-stage 41 Noncore areas include diagnostics, medical devices, phytopharmaceuticals, homeopathy, dietetics, dietary supplements, body and dental hygiene, germicides, and peripheral products. 42 Large firms potentially have a broader scope of business. The results are robust to the scaling. 43 Summary statistics for the regression variables are reported in online appendix B.
probit, and two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimators. Their results support the use of the multivariate probit model. To provide a final robustness test, I estimate the specification of the bivariate probit model in equation (2), using the 2SLS estimator. As the 2SLS estimator incorporates by construction all exogenous explanatory variables, including the two measures of firm experience, in the first-stage (authorized generic entry) equation, bivariate probit and 2SLS estimates may not be perfectly comparable. Nonetheless, a clear sense of patterns in the data should be provided. Angrist (2001) and Angrist and Pischke (2009) point out that conventional 2SLS estimation techniques capture local average treatment effects in nonlinear dependent variable settings with a dummy endogenous regressor such that 2SLS estimates are close to average marginal effects from nonlinear models in practice (Angrist & Pischke, 2009) .
To assess whether firms react differently to authorized generic entry due to varying levels of experience in markets, for instance, marginal effects are calculated for the 16 concerned and the full set of 73 drug markets. The calculation of average marginal effects in the recursive bivariate probit model is fairly involved (Greene, 1996 (Greene, , 1998 Christofides, Stengos, & Swidinsky, 1997; Greene, 1998 Greene, , 2008 Greene & Hensher, 2011) . Whenever variables appear in both equations, marginal effects are the sum of two terms. The first term states the direct effect of a 1-unit change in the variable on the probability that g im equals 1. The second term measures the indirect effect of this change-the impact on the probability that ag m equals 1, which in turn affects g im . While the computed marginal effects generally denote changes in the marginal probability of generic entry, the marginal effect of authorized generic entry is calculated as difference in the conditional probabilities of generic entry given the introduction vis-à-vis nonintroduction of authorized generics. If ρ = 0, this expression reduces to the formula reported in Greene (1998) : Φ(β 1 x 1 + δ 1 ag m ) − Φ (β 1 x 1 ) . 44 Aside from the summing and averaging of individual-specific effects, the calculation of marginal effects at mean values relies on the same formulas. The delta method is used to compute standard errors.
VI. Results
Estimates from a univariate probit regression provide preliminary insights into the impact of authorized generic entry on incentives for independent generic entry. Table 3 presents the regression estimates for the main specification and an extension in columns 1 and 2, the latter specification including the instrument Share of Noncore Products.
Although the composition of the data sets varies, the relative size of coefficients is remarkably similar. The results suggest that authorized generic entry has no significant impact on independent generic entry decisions. Preentry Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm (127 firm clusters in data set 1 and 125 firm clusters in data set 2). The dependent variable denotes the decision of a generic firm to enter a drug market following loss of exclusivity. Oral drugs in parasitology and sense organs with loss of exclusivity in 2002 form the reference group. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. revenues, by contrast, have a significant and positive effect on the likelihood of generic entry. Unlike Hurwitz and Caves (1988) and Hudson (2000) , who rely on data from the 1980s and 1990s, I find that the duration of monopoly affects generic entry positively, suggesting that generics will benefit more if drugs are well established. As a result of recent generic drug use initiatives in industrialized nations, including Germany, which eliminated the scope for reputational gains, the length of the exclusivity period may no longer be a good proxy for pioneers' accumulated goodwill. 45 The number of on-patent substitutes (Substitutes (B) ), a measure of the intensity of on-patent intramolecular competition, has a significant negative effect on generic entry, while the number of off-patent substitutes (Substitutes (G)) has no significant effect. Firms' therapeutic and drug form experience encourages market entry. Both effects are positive and significant. Finally, the instrumental variable Share of Noncore Products has no significant impact on generic entry in the singleequation probit regression, whereas it is highly significant and has the expected sign in the authorized generic entry equation of the recursive bivariate probit model. This result and the likelihood-ratio test of the restricted versus unrestricted bivariate probit model speak in favor of the validity of the instrument and identification strategy based on the exclusion restriction. 46 The bivariate probit estimates, presented in table 4, show that generic and authorized generic entry decisions are positively correlated. The correlation coefficient ρ is positive and significant. The Wald test indicates that the null 45 The results are robust to the exclusion of Monopoly Duration from the entry equations. 46 The results from the bivariate probit regression (restricted model) and likelihood-ratio are presented in online appendix D.
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hypothesis of ρ = 0 can be rejected. The positive correlation in the two equations implies that unobserved factors, increasing the likelihood of independent generic entry, similarly increase the likelihood of authorized generic entry. This suggests that authorized generic entry decisions are endogenous and univariate probit estimates are inconsistent.
Recursive bivariate probit estimates are also invariant to the introduction of market size interaction effects and alternative brand strategy controls. 47 The market size interaction effects are generally insignificant, and alternative brand strategies do not seem to significantly affect the likelihood of independent generic entry either.
To be able to compare the size of the estimated effects across the binary choice models and data sets, average marginal effects (AME) and marginal effects at mean values (MEM) are computed. In light of the endogeneity of authorized generic entry and the inconsistency of univariate probit estimates, the discussion of average marginal effects centers on the bivariate probit estimates, which reveal a consistent pattern across the two data sets of potential entrants. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm (127 firm clusters in data set 1 and 125 firm clusters in data set 2). In columns 1 and 3, an observation refers to the decision of a generic firm to enter a drug market following loss of exclusivity. In columns 2 and 4 the dependent variable denotes the occurrence of authorized generic entry prior to loss of exclusivity. Oral drugs in parasitology and sense organs with loss of exclusivity in 2002 form the reference group in the generic entry equation. The Wald test is conducted for the null hypothesis of ρ = 0. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. The table displays average marginal effects (AME) and marginal effects evaluated at mean values (MEM) calculated for the sample of sixteen drugs experiencing authorized generic entry between 2002 and 2007. Average marginal effects indicate average, ceteris paribus changes in the likelihood of independent (authorized) generic entry. In the bivariate probit model, the average marginal effect of authorized generic entry is calculated as the average difference in the likelihood of independent generic entry conditional on the introduction vis-à-vis nonintroduction of authorized generics (P(gim = 1|agm = 1) − P(gim = 1|agm = 0)), considering that ρ = 0. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. As seen in table 5, authorized generic entry has no significant impact on the probability of independent generic entry, looking at either average marginal effects or marginal effects at mean values. This shows that authorized generic entry does not affect the number of actual generic entrants for a molecule. A key influencing factor of independent and authorized generic entry decisions is preentry revenues: a 1 unit increase in the log-transformed variable induces a 6.6% to 18.4% increase in the probability of generic entry on average and a 29.4% to 32.7% increase in the likelihood of authorized generic entry. On the basis of the full sample of potential entrants, I predict a 4.3% to 15.8% average increase in the probability of generic entry as a results of a 1 unit increase in the log-transformed variable. 50 Given a standard deviation of 3.1 log units, preentry revenues explain a variation of 48.9% in the likelihood of independent generic entry across drug markets. 51 The effect of monopoly duration, by contrast, is smaller. As shown in table 5, a one-year increase in monopoly duration raises the probability of independent generic entry on average by 1.0% to 3.1% and the probability of authorized generic entry by 0.97% to 1.43%. The results further indicate that originators feel increasingly pressured to introduce authorized generics when competition from on-patent and off-patent substitute drugs is strong. A 1 unit increase in the number of on-patent and off-patent substitute ingredients increases the probability of authorized generic entry by about 9.94% to 12.21% and 1.76% to 1.35%, respectively. There is less evidence that on-patent and off-patent substitute ingredients affect the likelihood of independent generic entry. Therapeutic and drug form experience encourages independent generic entry, as shown in Scott Morton (1999) . The probability of generic entry increases on average by 2.92% to 4.08% (0.34% to 0.51%) with each additional product that the generic company has launched in a given therapeutic field (of a particular drug form) prior to loss of exclusivity. As potential entrants' therapeutic and drug form experience varies substantially, these effects are economically relevant. Finally, the larger the share of noncore products that are introduced by the originator in the year prior to loss of exclusivity, the more likely is authorized generic entry to occur, the likelihood of authorized generic entry increasing on average by 7.39% to 8.93% as the share of noncore products increases by 1 percentage point.
In summary, originators' decisions to issue authorized generics are largely driven by preentry revenues, the intensity of intermolecular competition, and originators' efforts 49 See online appendix F, for the full sample. 50 See online appendix F. 51 See online appendix B.
to expand the scope of business. Independent generic entry decisions are strongly determined by preentry revenues and firms' therapeutic and drug form experience. As the monotonic relationship of authorized generic entry and drug market preentry revenues indicates, originators introduce authorized generics first and foremost fueled by rent seeking rather than strategic entry-deterrence motives (Fisher-Ellison & Ellison, 2011) . Authorized generics do not deter generic entry in Germany. The fixed costs of market entry may, after all, be low enough for generic entry to be profitable in spite of the possible revenue reduction by authorized generic entry. This may hold true especially if a firm has already undertaken the studies necessary for market approval in another EU country and does not need to perform additional studies to enter the German generic drug market. Another possibility is that firms enjoy economies of scale and scope in manufacturing and supplying multiple generic drug products, which would make it favorable to enter a new drug market even if revenues left to independent generic entrants were reduced by authorized generic entry. 52
VII. Conclusion
It is often argued that originators' introduction of authorized generic drugs prior to loss of exclusivity could substantially lower incentives for independent generic entry. Authorized generic entrants eliminate firms' first-mover opportunity and capture a large share of generic revenues. From a policy perspective, it is indispensable to maintain sufficient incentives for independent generic entry to create competition and bring down prices for consumers.
This study assesses the impact of authorized generic entry on independent generic entry in the German pharmaceutical market between 2002 and 2007. Employing unique firm-level data, I estimate a recursive bivariate probit model to account for the nonrandomness of authorized generic entry (Hollis & Liang, 2006; Federal Trade Commission, 2009 . Identification relies on functional form and one exclusion restriction. The instrument, measuring the number of noncore product introductions of the originator in the year prior to loss of exclusivity relative to the size of the drug portfolio, captures originators' willingness to introduce authorized generics, which is unrelated to independent generic entry decisions. Regression results provide evidence of the endogeneity of authorized generic entry and indicate that originators, introducing noncore products in the year prior to patent (SPC) expiry, are more likely to issue authorized generics. Authorized generic entry, however, has no significant impact on the likelihood that an independent generic drug manufacturer enters a drug market. The entry decisions of independent generic firms are mainly influenced by preentry revenues and firms' therapeutic and drug form experience. These findings are robust to the introduction of
